Abstract
Introduction
One possible option to cope with increasing air traffic while maintaining or improving safety is the use of advanced decision support tools. Conflict detection lies at the heart of such tools, and therefore has been widely studied. The objective of the study presented here is to develop an evaluation environment together with an evaluation methodology to compare different conflict detection algorithms. The motivation is to estimate the benefits of the conflict detection enhancements proposed in a previous work [2] [3] .
The investigation into wind impacts on aircraft trajectory predictions.
The extension to provide a conflict probability estimation for flights that include heading and velocity changes.
A time-based probabilistic approach is proposed for predicted flight paths to be navigated by Flight Management Systems (FMS).
All three detection algorithms rely on the same trajectory prediction. However, since trajectory prediction is a complex subject by itself which does not fit in the scope of this work, it was decided to keep it as simple as possible. In this study, trajectory prediction assumes straight paths at constant speed. It means that the results may be much degraded if the tracks under analysis contain turns during that lookahead time. As we consider en-route traffic, which typically contains few and well spaced turns, the limitation might not be too severe. This will be explicitly looked into.
Evaluation methodology
The evaluation methodology of the conflict prediction algorithms is based on the work done in [8] and [1] .
The main issues regarding such a methodology are discussed next.
Building conflicts
The main difficulty when evaluating a conflict detection algorithm using real traffic data is that these data does not contain any conflict due to controller's actions. It is then not possible to evaluate a conflict detection algorithm using real traffic data and operational separation criteria, i.e. minimum vertical separation and minimum horizontal separation. The general idea is then to try to "create" conflicts in situations that they do not occur. The concept of a pseudo-conflict is therefore introduced. However, the main constraint is to maintain real-world effects such as; wind model errors, aircraft dynamics, navigation, radar track and flight intent errors.
There are many alternatives to creating conflicts, for example by expanding the minimum separation distances used operationally [1] :
horizontally expanded -maintain the vertical separation minima, but make the minimum horizontal separation larger;
vertically expanded -maintain the horizontal separation minima, make the minimum vertical separation larger;
vertically offset -similar to the vertically expanded but ignore aircraft with a separation less than a given value.
Alternatives to the expansion of the minimum separation include the modification of the track data, by doing:
• lateral position shift -offset in lateral position;
• altitude shift -offset in altitude;
• time shift -offset in time.
The altitude shift can be conceptually simulated by using the vertically offset.
Selecting the separation criteria
Some of the important sources of error (aircraft dynamics, radar track, winds) are directly taken into account by using real (recorded) track data. Modifying the data through time and/or position shifts could compromise the realism of those errors if the shifts were not properly chosen. The choice of how to shift the data requires a detailed study, which is outside the scope of this work. Therefore, lateral position shifts and time shifts are eliminated.
The pseudo-conflict should exhibit the same characteristic as the real one, in particular in terms of distribution of encounter angle and minimum horizontal separation. In [1] , it was found that altitude shift pseudo-conflict set provides the match.
Regarding the wind model errors, the main disadvantage of the vertically shift is that it implicitly assumes the same wind for at different altitudes. This is clearly not true, and can compromise the wind error model. Therefore, the amplitude of the altitude shift is usually chosen to be small, typically under 5000ft. It should be noticed that aircraft dynamics, navigation errors and radar track errors are maintained by using unmodified track data.
Similarly to [1] , the upper and lower bounds of the shift are respectively set to 2000ft and 5000ft. For aircraft having a vertical separation falling within these bounds, their vertical separation is ignored, and the horizontal separation alone determines the occurrence of a conflict. The lower bound of 2000ft has been chosen as two aircraft having this separation are never in a real conflict. However, this offset window may tend to over represent large encounter angle because this includes flight levels with opposing flying traffic. A further restriction of the lower bound to 4000ft assures that the aircraft flying at the same altitude and the ones in the consecutive flight level (which will tend to fly in opposing directions) are eliminated when above FL290.
From this point forward, pseudo-conflicts will be referred to simply as conflicts.
Evaluation metrics
Metrics for the evaluation of a conflict detection algorithm include the missed and false alert rates, number of predicted and observed conflicts, and conflict parameter errors such as root mean square errors in minimum separation and in time to conflict. It is also interesting to investigate these as a function of time to conflict [1] .
In addition, the rms values of the absolute prediction error, the along and cross-track prediction errors will be measured to characterise the trajectory predictions used as input to conflict detection.
The following definitions are used in the context of this work:
• CPA -Closest Point of Approach. The positions of the aircraft at the time the distance between their (predicted) tracks is minimum.
• Conflict -A conflict occurs between a pair of aircraft when, at the CPA, and independently of the current separation:
(a) the distance (separation) is less than the minimum separation and (b) the altitude difference is inside defined by the altitude shift window • Observed conflict -An observed conflict is a conflict that can be detected in the track data. It is not dependant on conflict detection or trajectory prediction algorithms.
• Alert -An alert is signalled if the predicted separation at the CPA is less than the required minimum.
• Predicted conflict -A predicted conflict correspond to an alert raised by a conflict detection algorithms. It thus depends on trajectory predictions and look ahead considered.
• LOS -Loss Of Separation. The first positions of the aircraft when their distance drops below the required minimum. The time before LOS is also called time to conflict.
• Correct alert -A correct alert requires both the LOS the time to conflict to match those of an observed conflict.
• Missed alert -A missed alert corresponds to an observed conflict that is not predicted • False alert -A false alert corresponds to a predicted conflict with no matching observed conflict.
These definitions imply that an event can be both a missed and a false alert. For example, if a conflict is being predicted before it actually starts, the event is a false alert because the predicted time to conflict is not correct. It is also a missed alert because there is a real conflict not correctly predicted.
The missed alerts are categorised by actual time to conflict while the false alerts are by predicted time to conflict. As for the correct alerts, by definition, the real time to conflict and the predicted time to conflict must be equal.
The number of predicted conflicts will be equal to the sum of the false and correct alerts only when using geometric detection as for the probabilistic algorithms these two numbers are sums of mean probabilities of conflict
The metrics selected to evaluate the algorithms focus on two aspects:
• Conflicts: Observed, Predicted, Correct;
• Alerts: Missed, False.
The conflicts are categorised by time to conflict, conflict probability and path cross angle. They could also have been categorised by minimum horizontal distance and altitude difference, or a combination of all these.
Evaluation environment
The real track has been recorded from ARTAS (ATM suRveillance Tracker And Server) at Eurocontrol Maastricht air traffic control centre. The recording were performed over 10 days, during four to six hours per day, at the busiest times. Only flights above FL170 were recorded. Due to the limitations of trajectory prediction, only level flights are considered and thus all tracks with a vertical speed with more than 300ft/min were discarded. Furthermore, all encounters with a path angle less than 15° were not considered.
A linear interpolation is used to align the time reference of all tracks. The shift induced is 0.91NM on average which is small compared to the horizontal separation minima used (8NM).
The evaluation environment was developed in C++ and is running under a UNIX/Solaris environment on a SUN workstation. The general structure is represented in Figure 1 . Note that the computation steps of the probability algorithms themselves are independent of how the trajectory prediction is made. The error models used by the conflict prediction algorithms are therefore tuned using a subset of the recorded track data, including only straight flight-paths.
Results
The objective of this study is not to assess the operational performance of the conflict detection algorithms, but rather to compare them. The relative values of the computed metrics are therefore more important than their absolute values. The absolute performance presented here may have no relation with the one they would exhibit when employed in a complete, operational conflict probe.
Before presenting the results of the conflict detection algorithms, the tuning of the error model to the trajectory prediction used is made. The geometric detection results are then presented. This simple method is used as a reference to compare the probabilistic algorithms. The geometric detection results section is also used to investigate the effect of changing the evaluation parameters, such as the search region, the minimum separation, or the altitude shift performed. The probabilistic conflict detection results are then obtained and discussed.
Prediction error
The prediction time range of 20 minutes was divided into one-minute intervals. For each interval mean, the standard deviations and rms position prediction error were computed for the along and cross-track axis, as well as the absolute position errors.
To better understand the behaviour of the straight-line trajectory prediction, the errors were computed for the two following cases: all tracks and straight-line tracks only. Figure 2 shows the comparison of the absolute prediction error for both cases. The errors were averaged at one-minute time intervals. The magnitude of the absolute prediction error is greater in the non straight-line case, as expected. Figure 3 compares the cross-track error for both cases. It is interesting to notice that the error is actually not very large in the straight-line case. The trajectory prediction used does not take turns into account, so the cross-track error in the general case is larger. Hence, even a simple model for taking turns taken into account may be sufficient to reduce noticeably the cross-track rms error. The along-track error will be seen as the most contributing to the total error. In this work, therefore, the cross-track position error is modeled as constant.
The along-track rms error is shown in Figure 4 . It shows that along-track errors are present in a similar way in both cases. While the cross-track error can be As the largest contribution to the prediction error is the along-track component, all the tests of the conflict detection algorithms are carried out using all the tracks and not just the straight-line tracks.
Geometric detection
The geometric detection is used to both validate the overall setup and as a baseline for the other algorithms.
The results are given in At a first look, the evolution of the rates generally corresponds to what is expected. The number of missed and false alerts decreases steadily with time to conflict, as the percentage of correct detections increases. They also decrease as the probability of conflict increases. As to the path angle, it can be seen that the missed and false alert rates are higher for the low angle category, since the low angle encounters tend to have greater duration and be more affected by cross correlation errors due to winds.
The observed conflict rate is fairly constant by time to conflict. The decrease showed for the longer time horizons is due to the large decrease in the number of pairs. The fact that the predicted conflict rate is over 100% for the high probability conflict is because the categorisation of the predicted conflicts is done by prediction time, which may be wrong. If a conflict is predicted at a given time to conflict, but is never observed, there still is a predicted conflict at that given time.
The number of pairs should also be explained to prevent confusion. When categorising by time, the number of pairs decreases, because not all the pairs were tracked during the total time horizon of the experience. In particular, the 0-5 min category has the same number of pairs than the overall category. The number of aircraft pairs in the categorisation by probability adds to more than the total because each pair can have different average probabilities at different times. By encounter angle, the sum of the number of pairs is equal to the total number of pairs because for each pair the path angle at the conflict is unique.
The results presented here indicate a poor performance of the geometric detection. However, it is heavily linked to the quality of trajectory prediction especially for the long prediction times.
Considering the time to conflict for the first five minutes, these results are quite similar to the ones shown in [8] , in which the missed and false alert rates are between 8.8% and 12.3%, and 10.3% and 17.3% respectively. For the longer time horizons, the poor performance is certainly due to the poor trajectory prediction. Another observation is the low missed alert rate for the high (80%-100%) probability range. The probability used is the mean probability, computed for each one-minute interval. In the geometric detection, as the probability of conflict is always zero or one, a high mean probability means that the conflict is being persistently predicted. In a situation where a conflict does occur, that means for that particular case that the prediction is actually good. This is an indication that the performance of the detection is a strong function of the performance of the trajectory prediction.
The counterpart of this is the low probability range results. The missed and false alert rates are very high. That can be explained because they are relative to the correct detections. It can be seen that the observed conflict rate is low for this category. That means necessarily that the number of correct alerts is also lower. In turn, a moderately low number of missed/false alerts may lead to a high respective rate. In particular, the number of correct predictions in the last column is about one-half, better than in the intermediate probability categories which have lower missed/false alert rates.
First five minutes
To investigate further the correctness of the evaluation environment, a zoom on the first five minutes is performed. Table 2 presents the results. The missed and false alert rates are very low for the first minute, but increasing steadily with time. This is consistent with the previous considerations regarding the trajectory prediction. Note also that the percentage of correct predictions is over 95% in the first minute. Table 2 ; Geometric detection: first five minutes.
Altitude shift
We now investigate the effect of changing the altitude shift. The results are presented in Table 3 . Geometric detection: 4000-5000ft altitude shift.
Search distance
When the search distance is increased, the total number of pairs is expected to increase, while the number of conflicts is constant. The observed conflict rate is then expected to decrease, although not necessarily by the same amount. The missed alert rate should remain constant as no conflicts are introduced. For the same reason, the number of correct alerts does not increase. This leads to an increase in the false alert rate. The following parameters are used:
• Minimum separation: 8NM Table 4 . Geometric detection: 4x8NM search distance. Table 4 presents the results. The changes in the rates are as expected. The false alert rate does increase, but comparing to the results for the 24NM search distance case, the difference increases with time to conflict. It can also be noted that the differences are larger in the situations that conflict detection is less capable. That is, in the small path angles and low probabilities categories. This behaviour is consistent with the fact that the accuracy of the predictions is not good for those cases.
Straight line tracks
A straight-line filter is used to exclude tracks that contains turns The parameters were: Given that the prediction error is larger when all the tracks are considered, it could be expected that the performance improved. Table 5 shows that the performance is generally better than in the general case (Table 1) , but not by a large amount. This leads to the conclusion that the fundamental problem with this simple trajectory prediction is not only the prediction of turns, but also the lack of modelling of speed changes or winds for example. These sources of errors are present in both straightline and all tracks cases.
Probabilistic detection
The two probabilistic conflict detection algorithms are studied in this section. We first tune the error models used by the algorithms and then apply them the conflict data set.
Error models
The two algorithms only model the along track errors.
In [5] , a polynomial is used for the along-track error variance:
var(e a (t)) = α t 2 where e a (t) is the along-track position error and α is a constant. The error model can be expressed in variance or rms if the mean error is small. In that case, the rms error is virtually equal to the standard deviation of the error, and the model for the error variance is related to the model for the rms error by a square root operation.
The second one, suggested in [2] ,models the error as:
var(e a (t)) = α' t+ β' t 2 + γ' t The constants are computed by a least-squares fitting of these models to the measured data. Figure 5 the square root of the variance (or rms). Note that in this case the square root of the variance is considered as equal to the rms error, as the measured mean error is small. The model equations are:
var(e a (t)) = 0.471 t Note that the error growth rate in NM/min is √0.471=0.686, which is equivalent to a growth rate of 41.1kts. This value is large and reflects the limited performance of the trajectory prediction used throughout this work.
It is now interesting to observe the effects of the different error models in the probability of conflict function. The evolution of the probability of conflict for the same example encounter is compared for the two previous models. Figure 6 . Effects of error models on conflict probability distribution.
The situation presented in Figure 6 has the following conflict parameters: path crossing angle is 90°, the speed of both aircraft is 480kts and the predicted separation is 0NM.
It can be seen that the evolution of the conflict probability with time has the same behaviour as the classical curves of [5] . However, the conflict probability value rapidly becomes low with increasing time. At 10 minutes to conflict, the conflict probability is under 0.60. The error model can explain this. In fact, as mentioned before, the conditions in which this study was carried out imply a large prediction error growth rate. A large prediction error means that the prediction is less certain and the conflict probability algorithm correctly assigns a low probability to these situations. This limits the usefulness of a conflict detection strategy based only on the conflict probability while ignoring the predicted separation at CPA.
Comparing the performance of the conflict probability algorithm for the two models, the model proposed by Blin shows a slightly better detection characteristics for the first 15 minutes. That is, the conflict probability is higher at the same fixed time. This will lead to a decrease in the missed alerts, but may increase the number of false alerts. Table 7 . Enhanced probabilistic detection from [3] .
The results of the two algorithms are presented in Table 6 and Table 7 . A probability threshold of 0.70 is used to detect conflicts. The predicted distance at CPA is not taken into account. For this reason, there is limited interest in categorising the results by probability.
The false alert rates are seen to be almost identical in both cases, but the performance in terms of missed alerts is slightly better in Table 7 . While the difference is smaller when categorising by time, the categorisation by path crossing angle shows that the model used Table 7 allows for a better performance of the detection algorithm.
Geometric vs. Probabilistic detection
Finally, the geometric and the enhances probabilistic detection [2] are now compared based on Table 1 and  Table 7 .
Surprisingly, considering the false and missed alerts as a function of look ahead time, the performance of the probabilistic detection is worse than the geometric detection. Indeed, the probabilistic method used here limits the detection to the computation of the conflict probability, regardless of the predicted CPA distance. This is worse in the present case, where the prediction error is large. As discussed in the previous section, the conflict probability is only high very close to the conflict due to the large uncertainty. Then, situations where a geometric method would detect a conflict would be a missed alert for a probabilistic method if the conflict probability was not sufficiently high. At more than some minutes to conflict, the probability of conflict (with the error model used) is always low, leading to the poor performance exhibited.
This can be further investigated by observing the missed and false alert rates as a function of the conflict probability. For high probabilities, both methods have similar performance. The decline is performance of the probabilistic method at lower probability seems very much to the detection threshold used.
Conclusion
An environment to quantitatively evaluate and compare conflict detection algorithms has been developed. It relies on a methodology adapted from [1] and uses real radar. A geometric, and of two probabilistic approaches were evaluated. While the use of a simple trajectory prediction precludes an operational evaluation, relative comparisons are still relevant. Regarding the probabilistic detection algorithm, the performance when using the error model proposed by [5] was compared to that obtained with the modifications proposed by [2] . It was found that the modified error model, approximating better the measured error, shows a decrease of the missed alert rate, while maintaining the false alert rate. The comparison of the geometric and probabilistic algorithms highlighted the sensitivity of the latter to parameters like the conflict probability threshold and the error model.
